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INTRODUCTION  
 
At a time when “email” was simply a misspelled word, Chief 
Justice Warren’s opinion in Hanson v. Denckla warned that 
advancements in communication and travel must not be read as 
signaling “the eventual demise of all restrictions on . . . personal 
jurisdiction.”1 Throughout the history of the Court’s jurisprudence, 
restrictions on personal jurisdiction have always centered upon 
geographic boundaries.2 As a result, the lower federal courts have 
struggled to comply with Justice Warren’s mandate while grappling 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2011, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology. The author wishes to thank Adam Goldstein, Matthew Bolon, and 
Mariana Karampelas, for their assistance and advice on this topic. This Comment is 
dedicated to Alexis Geller for her encouragement and support. 
1 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958). 
2 Wendy Collins Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal 
Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REV. 479 (1987). 
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with claims arising from the virtual realm of the Internet.3 
Underscoring this challenge, one district court judge reasoned that 
“[t]here being no District Court of Cyberspace, the defendants’ 
argument that laboring on the Internet defeats traditional personal 
jurisdiction is unpersuasive; Defendants will have to settle 
begrudgingly for the Western District of Virginia.”4 
The jurisdictional problems posed by claims arising from 
cyberspace stem from the nature and origin of the Internet.5 
Concerned with both the rising costs of centralized computing and the
potential for Cold War hostilities, the progenitors of the Internet 
sought to create a decentralized communications network that co
withstand a nuclear attack.
 
uld 
tworks” 
here at once.   
                                                
6 These efforts resulted in the initial 
framework for the modern Internet—a diffuse “network of ne
without a centralized hub.7 As a result, the Internet defies traditional 
notions of geographic boundaries, as online actions occur both 
everywhere and now 8
Yet, out of all online activities, this Comment posits that 
cybersquatting poses the greatest obstacle to the territorial restrictions 
of personal jurisdiction. Cybersquatting occurs when an individual 
seeks to profit by registering a website address—known as a domain 
name—under another’s well-established trademark.9 For example, 
cybersquatting occurs when an individual with no affiliation to Coca-
 
3 Yasmin R. Tavakoli & David R Yohannan, Personal Jurisdiction in 
Cyberspace: Where Does it Begin, and Where Does it End?, 23 No. 1 INTELL. PROP. 
& TECH. L.J. 3, 3 (2011). 
4 Design88 Ltd. v. Power Uptik Productions, LLC, 133 F. Supp. 2d 873, 877 
(W.D. Va. 2001). 
5 John J. Schulze, Jr., Caveat E-Emptor: Solutions to the Jurisdictional 
Problem of Internet Injury, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 615, 618 (2006). 
6 Id. 
7 Id.  
8 Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 462 (D. Mass. 
1997). 
9 See Panavision, Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998). 
Panavision is one of the first—and certainly most heralded—cybersquatting cases, 
in which notorious cybersquatter Dennis Toeppen registered the domain name 
“panavision.com,” and sought to extort a fee from the rightful trademark holder in 
exchange for surrendering the domain name.  
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Cola seeks to profit by registering the domain name “coca-cola.com.” 
Because cybersquatting involves purely online activities, the lack of 
any geographic nexus created between this conduct and the forum 
state proves uniquely problematic for injured plaintiffs, as they bear 
the burden of establishing a “prima facie case for personal 
jurisdiction” over the defendant.10 Yet, this burden may have been 
lessened considerably due to a recent decision from the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals.11 In a surprising ruling that is sure to 
become the darling of all future plaintiffs in cybersquatting dispu
the Seventh Circuit bent the traditional rules for personal jurisdicti
beyond their breaking point to uphold a cybersquatting claim filed 
against GoDaddy—the world’s largest domain name provider.
tes, 
on 
                                                
12 
In this Comment, I will argue that the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning 
in uBID, Inc. v. GoDaddy Group, Inc. (GoDaddy II) demonstrates the 
fundamental disjunction between the International Shoe standard for 
personal jurisdiction and claims of cybersquatting filed under the 
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”). Part I of this 
Comment examines the growth and development of the Supreme 
Court’s precedent regarding personal jurisdiction, highlighting the 
territorial restrictions imposed by the due process clauses of the 
Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments. Part II of this Comment provides a 
brief overview of cybersquatting and the ACPA. Part III of this 
Comment focuses on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in GoDaddy II. In 
Part IV, I shall demonstrate how both the GoDaddy II majority and 
concurrence utilized reasoning that undermines existing Supreme 
Court jurisprudence, and how Congress can resolve these 
jurisdictional issues with the stroke of a pen.  
 
 
10 E.g., uBID, Inc. v. GoDaddy Group, Inc. (GoDaddy II), 623 F.3d 421, 423 
(7th Cir. 2010). 
11 Id. 
12 See id. at 433. 
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I. The Origins And Development Of Personal Jurisdiction 
 
A. The Other Shoe Drops: The Shift to Minimum Contacts 
 
The Supreme Court’s opinions on personal jurisdiction deal 
primarily with the constitutional requirements of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s due process clause, which provides that: “[n]o 
State . . . shall deprive any person of life, liberty, and property, without 
due process of law. . . .”13 Throughout the history of the Court’s 
jurisprudence, the Due Process Clause has consistently required some 
physical connection between the defendant and the forum state.14 
Historically, this requirement imposed a severe limitation: A court’s 
power to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant depended 
entirely on her presence within the forum state.15 This “power theory,” 
articulated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Pennoyer v. Neff, was 
eventually cast aside in order to cope with the changing landscape of 
American commerce.16 As the reach of corporations began to extend 
across state lines, the Court recognized that the “presence” of these 
corporations could no longer be confined to their state of domicile.17 
Laying the framework for what would soon become the touchstone for 
all Due Process inquiries into personal jurisdiction, the Court’s 
landmark decision in International Shoe v. Washington crafted a new 
standard for determining the constitutional scope of personal 
jurisdiction.”18 
In International Shoe, the Court considered whether Due Process 
permitted the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident 
corporation based upon the commercial activities of its employees 
                                                 
13 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
14 Perdue, supra note 2, at 509. The author explains that the Court’s opinions 
evidence a belief that the requirements of personal jurisdiction serve a substantive 
interest tied to state boundaries. Id. This substantive interest flows from the 
requirement that the defendant must have sufficient contacts with the forum state. Id.  
15 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877). 
16 See International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (examining 
the expanding role of corporations in interstate commerce). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
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within the forum state.19 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Stone 
reasoned that a corporation’s “continuous and systematic” commercial 
transactions within a state may well serve as a proxy for its presence 
within the forum.20 As the corporate entity itself is a constructive 
fiction, its “presence” may manifest itself through the commercial 
activities of its employees.21 Thus, a corporation that enjoys the 
benefit of conducting business within a state must also incur the costs 
and obligations arising from those transactions.22  
The reasoning from International Shoe demonstrated both 
equitable and practical considerations.23 Namely, the Court recognized 
that the rigid territorial restrictions on personal jurisdiction no longer 
remained practical in light of the decreasing costs of interstate 
commerce that allowed businesses to stretch their economic presence 
across state lines.24 As such, conditioning the exercise on the territorial 
state boundaries was no longer sufficient to deal with vast expansion 
of interstate commerce.25 Instead, the Court declared that the exercise 
of personal jurisdiction remains constitutionally permissible so long as 
the defendant has “certain minimum contacts with it such that the 
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice.”26 
Although International Shoe heralded a new era in personal 
jurisdiction, the Court’s newly minted jurisdictional framework test 
remained loyal to the traditional emphasis on the geographical nexus 
between the defendant and the forum.27 This notion underscores the 
                                                 
19 Id. at 311. 
20 Id. at 316–17. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 319. 
23 See id. at 317. Previously, a nonresident corporation could only be subject to 
jurisdiction if they provided an agent for the service of process. Id. The Court’s 
decision recognized that a corporate “presence” could not be construed so narrowly. 
Id. at 316–18. 
24 Id. at 320. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 316 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
27 See id. (grounding the due process inquiry on the defendant’s activities 
within the forum state).  
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distinction between general and specific jurisdiction, which is outlined 
in the following sections. 
 
1. General Jurisdiction 
 
The Court’s decision in Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, 
S.W. v. Hall28 first articulated the distinction between general and 
specific jurisdiction.29 The concept of general jurisdiction is best 
conceptualized as personal jurisdiction over the defendant, as she must 
defend herself against any conceivable claim filed within the forum.30 
For instance, imagine that A lives in Colorado but is subject to general 
jurisdiction in Iowa. While on vacation in Australia, A gets into a car 
accident with Z, who hails from Spain. If Z decides to file a personal 
injury lawsuit against A in Iowa, A must travel to the forum to defend 
against the suit—despite the fact that none of the parties, evidence, or 
injuries bear any relationship to A’s activities within the forum.31 
Indeed, one commentator argues that the concept of general 
jurisdiction “should be termed ‘dispute-blind’ because the exercise of 
jurisdiction does not depend on the nature of or the facts involved in 
the dispute.”32 Instead, the exercise of general jurisdiction requires that 
the defendant’s activities create a permanent proxy for her presence 
within the forum state.33  
Although the general jurisdictional analysis only requires a single 
inquiry—the relationship between the defendant’s activities and the 
forum state—the Court’s opinion in Helicopteros demonstrates that 
                                                 
28 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
29 Id. at 414, n.8. While this was the first opinion in which the Court actually 
referred to these concepts as such, these concepts were first expressed in 
International Shoe. See 326 U.S. at 317–18.  
30 See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414; accord, e.g.,GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d 421, 
426 (7th Cir. 2010). 
31 See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414. 
32 Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, 34 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 807, 819 (2004) (citing Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General 
Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 613, 680 (1988)). 
33 See Rhodes, supra note 32, at 849–50 (noting that the contemporary doctrine 
of general jurisdiction hinges upon a “constructive presence”). 
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this analysis imposes an incredibly high threshold requirement.34 For 
instance, the Helicopteros plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action in 
Texas based upon a helicopter crash that occurred in Peru.35 The 
defendant corporation made numerous trips to forum, where it 
contracted for helicopter services and spent over $4 million to 
purchase 80% of its helicopter fleet and related equipment.36 
Additionally, the defendant sent its pilots, management, and 
maintenance personnel to Texas for related training.37 Nevertheless, 
the Court found these frequent trips and high volume purchases failed 
to create the forum contacts necessary to establish general 
jurisdiction.38 Rather, an earlier precedent demonstrates that this 
requirement can only be met when a defendant directs her continuous 
and systematic activities from a physical location within the forum 
state.39  
 
2. Specific Jurisdiction 
 
Specific jurisdiction is best conceptualized as jurisdiction over the 
claim, rather than the defendant.40 Essentially, specific jurisdiction  
permits the court to adjudicate claims that “directly arise from or relate 
to” the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.41 The relevant 
analysis breaks down into two separate inquiries: (1) the defendant’s 
contacts with the forum; and (2) the relationship between these 
                                                 
34 See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 417–18 (citing Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. 
Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 518 (1923) (defendant that made frequent trips to 
forum to purchase majority of its inventory was insufficient to establish general 
jurisdiction). 
35 Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 410. 
36 Id. at 410. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 415–16. 
39 See id. at 414–415. Specifically, the Court examined the earlier decision of 
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). In Perkins, 
general jurisdiction existed when a Philippine mining company established a 
temporary corporate office in Ohio due to the Japanese occupation of the Philippine 
Islands. Id.  
40 Cf. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472–73 (1985). 
41 Id. 
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contacts and the plaintiff’s claim.42 These dual components serve a 
primary policy consideration of the International Shoe framework.43 
Specifically the geographic nexus between the defendant’s contacts, 
the forum, and the claim must allow the defendant to reasonably 
anticipate that her conduct will subject her to the judicial powers of the 
state.44  
The Court’s decisions mandate that the defendant’s intentional 
conduct must create the geographic nexus between contacts, claim, 
and forum.45 In light of this requirement, the plaintiff’s contacts with 
the forum cannot subject the defendant to the state’s judicial powers.46 
For instance, a Florida state court lacked jurisdiction over a trustee 
whose only contact with the forum arose when the settlor of the trust 
subsequently moved from Delaware to Florida.47 Similarly, 
Oklahoma’s exercise of specific jurisdiction over a New Jersey car 
dealership was held impermissible based solely upon the fact that the 
plaintiff sustained an injury while driving through the forum.48 These 
cases demonstrate a recurring theme that appears throughout the 
Court’s decisions: “The unilateral activity of those who claim some 
relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the 
requirement of contact with the forum State.”49Rather, what is critical 
to the exercise of personal jurisdiction is that the defendant 
“purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities 
within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its 
laws.”50  
By focusing on the geographic nexus established through the 
substance of the defendant’s contacts with the forum, the jurisdictional 
                                                 
42 See, e.g., GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d 421, 427–42 (7th Cir. 2010) (analyzing 
components separately). 
43 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474. 
44 Id.; accord World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 
(1980). 
45 See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).  
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 252. 
48 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286. 
49 Hanson, 357 U.S. at 252. 
50 Id.  
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analysis allows the defendant to reasonably anticipate the possibility 
of having to defend her actions in the forum.51 The Court’s opinions 
take great pains to emphasize this requirement, often declaring that the 
basis for exerting specific jurisdiction cannot stem from the 
defendant’s “random, fortuitous, or attenuated” connections with the 
forum that bear no relation to the substance of the plaintiff’s claim.52 
Thus, where the defendant lacks the necessary connections with the 
forum to assert general jurisdiction, the strong geographic connection 
among the defendant, the suit, and the forum required to exert specific 
jurisdiction serves two primary functions.53 First, it protects a non-
resident defendant from the threat of litigation in a distant forum.54 
Second—and more importantly—it ensures that the jurisdictional 
power of the respective states remain largely confined to acts 
occurring within their territorial borders.55  
 
3. The Relatedness Inquiry 
 
The aspect of the International Shoe analysis that has proven 
particularly troubling for courts is determining the nexus between the 
defendant’s forum contacts and the substance of the plaintiff’s claim—
often referred to as the “relatedness inquiry.”56 Although Helicopteros 
established that the exercise of specific jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s 
claim must “arise from or relate to” the defendant’s contacts with the 
forum,57 the Court’s decisions have never set forth a standard to 
determine when this requirement is satisfied.58 As a result, this 
language from Helicopteros spawned a variety of disparate tests used 
to determine whether a defendant’s contacts satisfy the “relatedness” 
                                                 
51 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 
52 Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 462 (1985). 
53 Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 See, e.g., GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d 421, 429 (7th Cir. 2010). 
57 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984). 
58 Robert J. Condlin, "Defendant Veto" or "Totality of the Circumstances"? It's 
Time for the Supreme Court to Straighten Out the Personal Jurisdiction Standard 
Once Again, 54 CATH U. L. REV. 53, 126 (2004) 
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component of the International Shoe standard.59 The two most 
commonly employed tests for this analysis derive from the tort-related 
concepts of but-for and proximate causation.60  
Under the but-for causation standard, the exercise of specific 
jurisdiction is often a foregone conclusion whenever the plaintiff can 
establish that the defendant has purposefully availed itself within the 
forum.61 Devoid of any limiting factor, the but-for standard closely 
scrutinizes each link in the causal chain to uncover any possible 
connection between a defendant’s contacts and the plaintiff’s claim.62 
Armed with the benefit of hindsight, courts applying the but-for 
standard may exert specific jurisdiction so long as the plaintiff 
demonstrates that her injury would not have occurred in the absence of 
the defendant’s forum contacts.63  
At the other end of the spectrum, courts employing the proximate 
cause standard impose a far greater threshold requirement for 
demonstrating the relatedness component of the specific jurisdictional 
inquiry.64 The “proximate cause” standard requires a showing that the 
defendant’s forum contacts are the legal cause for the plaintiff’s 
injury.65 Essentially, this analysis turns on whether any of the 
defendant’s forum contacts are relevant to the facts underlying the 
plaintiff’s complaint.66  
One last standard for examining the relationship between contacts 
and the claim requires a closer examination, as this standard ultimately 
controlled the outcome of the Seventh Circuit majority’s opinion in 
GoDaddy II.67 In O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., the Third Circuit 
                                                 
59 GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 429. 
60 Id. at 430. 
61 Nowak v. Tak How Inv., Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 715 (1st Cir. 1996).  
62 See id. 
63 Id. 
64 GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 430. 
65 Id. (citing Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc., v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 142 F.3d 
26, 35 (1st Cir. 1998)). 
66 O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 319 (3d Cir. 2007). 
67 623 F.3d at 430. 
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fashioned its “quid-pro-quo” standard in response to a rather esoteric 
set of facts that gave rise to a negligence claim.68  
Following their vacation in Barbados, the plaintiff and his wife 
began receiving newsletters and solicitations from the hotel they 
stayed at during their trip.69 The following year, the plaintiff and his 
wife decided to return to Barbados, electing to stay at the same hotel 
they had booked on their earlier trip.70 After securing their 
reservations, the couple received a brochure from the hotel detailing 
the various services provided at its spa.71 Enticed by the brochure, the 
couple called the hotel to purchase a spa package for the upcoming 
trip.72 After receiving one of the massages included in this package, 
the plaintiff slipped in the shower and “tore his rotator cuff.”73 Upon 
returning home to Pennsylvania, the plaintiff filed a negligence claim 
in federal court against the Barbadian resort.74  
Reasoning that the resort’s continued solicitation of the plaintiff 
provided the forum contacts required by International Shoe, the Third 
Circuit considered whether the negligence claim at bar arose from or 
related to these contacts, finding that the resort’s continued solicitation 
of the plaintiff provided the forum contacts required by International 
Shoe.75 Having rejected the proximate cause standard in an earlier 
precedent,76 the Third Circuit’s opinion in O’Connor cast aside the 
but-for cause standard as too over-inclusive.77 In an attempt to strike a 
balance between these two extremes, the court carved out a new “quid-
pro-quo” standard for assessing the relationship between contacts and 
claim.78 
                                                 
68 496 F.3d at 315–16. 
69 Id. at 315. 
70 Id. at 316. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id.  
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 318. 
76 Id. at 320. 
77 Id. at 322. 
78 Id. at 323. 
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The Third Circuit explained that the relatedness inquiry should 
focus on the “reciprocity principle” underlying the requirements of 
specific jurisdiction.79 Specifically, each economic or legal benefit 
derived from a defendant’s forum contacts naturally gives rise to 
accompanying obligations.80 In light of this concept, the relatedness 
component of the International Shoe test must “maintain balance in 
this reciprocal exchange.”81 Although conceding that this method is 
less stringent than the proximate cause standard employed by other 
courts, the Third Circuit reasoned that the relationship between the 
claim and contacts must be “intimate enough to keep the quid-pro-quo 
proportional and personal jurisdiction reasonably foreseeable.”82  
Turning to the substance of the plaintiff’s claim, the Third Circuit 
concluded that the relationship between the plaintiff’s negligence 
claim and the resort’s forum contacts was “intimate enough” to uphold 
specific jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim.83 Essentially, the court 
reasoned that “through its mailings and phone calls,” the resort had 
entered into a contractual obligation to provide the plaintiff’s with spa 
services.84 The benefits that the hotel received from this contract gave 
rise to certain obligations—such as ensuring that it exercised due care 
in performing its services.85 Having failed to do so, the court 
concluded that the relationship between the plaintiff’s claim and the 
hotel’s various brochures and phone calls were intimately related 
enough to keep the quid-pro-quo balanced and reasonable.86 
Ironically, although the Third Circuit seemed quite enamored with 
its “new” standard for examining the relatedness component of the 
specific jurisdictional inquiry, this quid-pro-quo standard is little more 
than a repackaged version of the but-for causation standard that the 
court expressly rejected as too “over- inclusive.”87 Indeed, the court’s 
                                                 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id.  
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 See id. at 322. 
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explanation of the proportional relationship between economic 
benefits and obligations is primarily a rephrasing of the policy 
rationales underlying the International Shoe decision88—not a formula 
for determining the relationship between contacts and claim. If 
anything, the ambiguous language of the O’Connor decision 
seemingly incorporates an ad-hoc cost-benefit analysis into the but-for 
standard for determining the relationship between contacts and 
claim.89 Under the Third Circuit’s rationale, would this relationship 
between the plaintiff’s injury and the hotel’s contacts have ceased to 
exist if the hotel simply offered to provide the massage for only a 
dollar? What if the parties had waited to consummate the transaction 
until the plaintiff arrived in Barbados? These types of economic 
factors speak to whether the “nature and quality” of the defendant’s 
contacts form the requisite geographic nexus with the forum, not the 
relationship between these contacts and the plaintiff’s claim.90  
Although the Supreme Court has yet to endorse any of these 
standards, the proximate cause standard tracks closest with the guiding 
principles of the International Shoe framework—the defendant must 
be able to reasonably anticipate that her conduct will subject her to the 
state’s judicial powers.91 Whereas the but-for standard threatens to 
trap an unwary defendant within the links of an attenuated causal 
chain, the proximate cause standard allows defendant to reasonably 
anticipate being subject to jurisdiction within the forum by requiring
that her conduct forms the legal cause for the plaintiff’s claim.
 
uo 
 above.   
                                                
92 
Moreover, this requirement of legal causation avoids the quid-pro-q
standard’s discretionary cost-benefit analysis detailed 93
 
88 See 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (explaining that one who enjoys the benefits 
and protections of a forum’s laws must bear the accompanying obligations). 
89 The Third Circuit explained that the relatedness component must ensure a 
close fit between the scope of the benefits derived from the defendant’s forum 
contacts and the accompanying obligations. See 496 F.3d at 423. 
90 See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318. 
91 Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985); Nowak v. Tak How 
Inv., Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 715 (1st Cir. 1996). 
92 Nowak, 94 F.3d at 715. 
93 See O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 323 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(balancing economic benefits against resulting legal obligations). 
386 
13
Barbakoff: No Shoes, No Service? Why Cybersquatting Has Outgrown the Interna
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2011
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 6, Issue 2                         Spring 2011 
 
 
4. The Reasonableness Inquiry 
 
Once the plaintiff provides a prima facie case for personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant, a court must examine additional 
factors to determine the reasonableness of maintaining a suit within 
the forum.94 Such factors include “the burden on the defendant, the 
forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff’s 
interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the interstate 
judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of 
controversies, and the shared interest of the several State’s in 
furthering fundamental substantive social policies.”95  
The Court’s opinions steadfastly claim that this reasonableness 
inquiry forms a critical component of any jurisdictional inquiry; 
however, its treatment of the aforementioned factors remains little 
more than a token gesture.96 As the Court noted in Burger King, a 
defendant that “seeks to defeat jurisdiction . . . must present a 
compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would 
render jurisdiction unreasonable.”97 As one commentator notes, the 
Court’s opinions demonstrate that the final outcome rests almost 
exclusively on whether the defendant has created the requisite 
minimum contacts by “purposefully availing” herself of the benefits 
and protections of the forum state’s laws.98  
 
B. Tabloids and Dirty Magazines: The Bases of Jurisdiction in 
GoDaddy II 
 
Before proceeding further, there are two particular Supreme Court 
precedents that require a closer examination in order to understand the 
                                                 
94 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476. 
95 Id. at 477 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
96 William M. Richman, Understanding Personal Jurisdiction, 25 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 599, 634 (1993). 
97 Id. (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477).  
98 Id. 
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Seventh Circuit’s fractured decision in GoDaddy II: Keeton v. Hustler 
Magazine99 and Calder v. Jones.100  
 
1. The Keeton decision 
 
The broadest proposition that emerges from Keeton is relatively 
straightforward: A plaintiff does not have to demonstrate that a 
defendant corporation specifically focused its business activities on the 
forum to demonstrate the purposeful availment requirement of 
International Shoe.101 Rather, a corporation purposefully avails itself 
in every forum where it conducts a substantial amount of business.102  
In Keeton, the plaintiff brought suit against Hustler Magazine in a 
New Hampshire State Court, alleging that the magazine printed 
libelous stories about her in five separate issues of its publication.103 
Although the magazine company was incorporated in Ohio and held 
its principal place of business in California, it circulated approximately 
ten to fifteen thousand copies of its magazine throughout New 
Hampshire each month.104 As the Court explained in its analysis, the 
Keeton defendant purposefully directed its business activities at the 
forum through these regular monthly sales of its publication.105 
Therefore, the Court declared that it was “unquestionable” that New 
Hampshire could exercise specific jurisdiction over any claims directly 
arising from this monthly circulation of the defendant’s magazine.106 
The tort of libel occurs wherever a publication is circulated, thus New 
Hampshire could clearly exercise jurisdiction over any claims arising 
from the circulation of the defendant’s magazine within the forum.107 
While this notion may seem fairly straightforward, a rather unique 
                                                 
99 465 U.S. 770 (1984). 
100 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
101 See Keeton, 465 U.S. at 779 (forum contacts were a limited part of 
defendant’s general business). 
102 Id. at 779–80. 
103 Id. at 772. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 774. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
388 
15
Barbakoff: No Shoes, No Service? Why Cybersquatting Has Outgrown the Interna
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2011
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 6, Issue 2                         Spring 2011 
 
aspect of the law of libel added a complicated twist to the Keeton 
decision—the single publication rule.108 
The single publication rule is a limited exception to the general 
rules governing defamation.109 Generally, each identical, defamatory 
statement made by the same individual constitutes a separate cause of 
action.110 The single publication rule, however, allows plaintiffs to 
bring a single, multi-state libel claim for every allegedly libelous 
publication circulated through the entire country.111 Put another way, 
the Keeton plaintiff brought suit in New Hampshire for every copy of 
the magazine distributed throughout the United States—despite the 
fact that only a small portion of these magazines were actually 
circulated within the forum.112 As such, both the district and appellate 
courts below dismissed the claim for lack of personal jurisdiction, 
reasoning, “the New Hampshire tail is too small to wag so large an 
out-of-state dog.”113 
Disagreeing with the reasoning of the courts below, the 
Supreme Court found that New Hampshire could properly exercise 
specific jurisdiction over plaintiff’s multi-state libel claim.114 First, the 
Court explained that the defendant had “continuously and deliberately 
exploited the New Hampshire market” through its monthly circulation 
within the forum, and thus could “reasonably anticipate” being haled 
into the forum state to defend against libel claims directly arising from 
the contents of its magazine.115 Moreover, the defendant should 
anticipate that such suits would seek to recover damages for every 
publication circulated throughout the country, as the defendant “could 
be charged with knowledge of the single publication rule.”116 Under 
this reasoning, the Court concluded that Due Process did not shield the 
                                                 
108 See id. at 773. 
109 Id. at 774 n.3 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577(A)(4) (1977)). 
110 Id.  
111 Id. at 773. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 781. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
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defendant from being called upon to defend against a multi-state libel 
suit wherever it regularly sold and distributed its magazine.117 
 
2. The Effects Test: Creating a Geographic Nexus with the Forum 
Through the Commission of an Intentional Tort 
 
Decided the same day as Keeton, the Calder opinion added an 
unexpected wrinkle into the minimum contacts test—providing a 
limited means for exerting personal jurisdiction based on acts 
committed outside the forum state.118 In Calder, the plaintiff filed suit 
for libel in California based on an article written and edited by the 
defendants.119 The defendants, however, arguably lacked any 
meaningful contacts with the forum that related to the plaintiff’s 
claim.120 Both defendants lived and worked in Florida, where the 
allegedly libelous article was written and edited.121 Although the 
magazine had its highest circulation within the state of California, 
neither defendant had any control over the magazine’s distribution, nor 
did they derive any direct economic benefit from its circulation within 
the forum.122  
Notwithstanding the lack of any economic ties to the forum, the 
Court reasoned that the defendants had created the requisite minimum 
contacts to support specific jurisdiction through their article’s effects 
within the forum.123 Emphasizing that the claim at issue did not arise 
from “untargeted negligence,” the Calder opinion noted that the 
defendants had “expressly aimed” their conduct at the forum state 
through their allegedly libelous article.124 In reaching this conclusion, 
the Court carefully noted that the defendants culled the information 
                                                 
117 Id. 
118 See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–90 (1984) (explaining how the 
defendant’s allegedly tortious article—written entirely in Florida—created the 
contacts necessary to uphold personal jurisdiction in California). 
119 Id. at 784. 
120 Id. at 785–86. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id.  
124 Id. at 789–90. 
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used in their article exclusively from sources in California.125 The 
article focused entirely on the plaintiff’s activities in California, where 
the plaintiff lived and worked in the entertainment industry.126 As 
such, the resulting harm created by the article would have its greatest 
effect in California, where the damage to the plaintiff’s reputation 
would negatively impact her acting career.127 In light of these factors, 
the Court concluded that the defendants should have reasonably 
anticipated that they might be “hailed into court” based upon the 
harmful effects of their article.128 
The reasoning of Calder provided what is now commonly known 
as the three-pronged “effects test” for asserting jurisdiction based upon 
an intentional act committed outside of the forum state. The effects 
test requires that the defendant: (1) commit an intentional act; (2) 
recognize his conduct’s harmful effect on the plaintiff; and (3) 
expressly aim his conduct toward the forum.129  
Notably, Calder does not provide an alternative to the 
International Shoe standard.130 This is why the Ninth Circuit once 
reasoned that characterizing Calder’s analytical framework as the 
“effects test” may place too much emphasis on the harmful effects 
prong.131 In particular, Calder “cannot stand for the broad proposition 
that a foreign act with foreseeable effects in the forum state will 
always give rise to specific jurisdiction.”132 Had the Court intended 
such an expansive grant of personal jurisdiction, it would have clearly 
                                                 
125 Id. at 789. 
126 Id. 
127 Id.  
128 Id. at 790. 
129 Id. 
130 See id. (explaining that exercise of personal jurisdiction necessarily requires 
an examination of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state). 
131 Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(something more is required than mere foreseeability of harmful effect felt within the 
forum). 
132 Pebble Beach, 453 F.3d at 1156 (quoting Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. 
Augusta Nat. Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087(9th Cir. 2000)). 
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stated as much in its opinion.133 Rather, Calder’s intensive fact-based 
analysis demonstrates that the express aiming component of the effects 
test actually provides the forum contacts necessary to exert personal 
jurisdiction.134  
 
C. The Lighter Side of Jurisdiction: The Zippo Test 
 
As noted earlier, the International Shoe standard serves a critical 
role in ensuring that a state’s jurisdictional powers remain confined 
within its territorial boundaries.135 Naturally, these territorial 
restrictions have proven particularly problematic in regards to Internet-
related claims because the allegedly harmful conduct occurs in a realm 
that defies all notions of geographic borders.136 Although the Supreme 
Court has yet to fashion a jurisdictional standard for Internet-related 
claims, the Western District of Pennsylvania attempted to fashion such 
a test in Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.137  
This “Zippo test” provides three categories situated along a 
sliding-scale that determines the propriety of exercising personal 
jurisdiction based upon the interactivity of a defendant’s website.138 At 
the “far end of this spectrum” are highly interactive websites that 
enable a defendant to conduct business over the Internet.139 If such 
websites allow the defendant to enter into contractual relationships 
with its customers, the exercise of personal jurisdiction is proper.140 At 
                                                 
133 Contra Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) (reaffirming the notion 
that the exercise of jurisdiction requires a court to examine each individual 
defendant’s contacts with the forum state). 
134 See, e.g., Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 705–06 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(exercising personal jurisdiction requires forum state injury and “something more” in 
the form of conduct expressly aimed at the forum state); accord Condlin, supra note 
58, at 94. Here, the author explains that the Calder Court emphasized the express 
“targeting” of the forum to demonstrate why it was “fair to take jurisdiction over the 
defendants.” Condlin, supra note 58, at 94. 
135 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 252 (1958). 
136 Tavakoli & Yohannan, supra note 3, at 3. 
137 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997)  
138 Id. at 1124. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
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the other end of Zippo’s sliding-scale are strictly passive websites that 
“only make information available” to interested parties.141 Under the 
Zippo standard, these passive websites are insufficient to support the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction.142 Between these two poles lies a 
middle category, comprised of those websites that allow users to 
“exchange information” with the defendant’s “host computer.”143 
Essentially, Zippo’s sliding-scale approach applies solely to this 
middle category, as the Zippo standard automatically confers or denies 
personal jurisdiction whenever a website is deemed either highly-
interactive or strictly passive.144 When websites fall into Zippo’s 
middle category, however, the issue of personal jurisdiction is resolved 
by closely scrutinizing “the level of interactivity and commercial 
nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site.”145 
While many courts initially seized upon Zippo as a useful guide 
for exerting personal jurisdiction over Internet-based claims, many 
commentators question the continued utility of this approach.146 This 
is because courts are perfectly capable of determining whether a 
defendant created the forum contacts necessary to uphold jurisdiction 
without regard to the interactivity of her website.147 Although modern 
companies may use more sophisticated electronic mediums for 
conducting business, the geographic connection created through their 
                                                 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 See id. 
145 Id. 
146 See, e.g., Catherine Ross Dunham, Zippo-ing the Wrong Way: How the 
Internet Has Misdirected the Federal Courts in Their Personal Jurisdiction 
Analysis, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 559 (2009); Dennis T. Yokoyama, You Can't Always 
Use the Zippo Code: The Fallacy of a Uniform Theory of Internet Personal 
Jurisdiction, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1147 (2005); Bunmi Awoyemi, Zippo Is Dying, 
Should It Be Dead?: The Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction by U.S. Federal Courts 
over Non-Domiciliary Defendants in Trademark Infringement Lawsuits Arising Out 
of Cyberspace, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 37 (2005). 
147 See, e.g., Dunham, supra note 146, at 579–80. The author explains that the 
Court’s development of the International Shoe framework sufficiently deals with 
remote interactions between the defendant and forum. 
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forum contacts remains the same.148 For instance, if a company 
regularly sells and ships its products to customers in a particular 
forum, it makes little difference whether the company locates its 
customers through telephone solicitation, targeted catalogue mailings, 
or an interactive website.149 As one commentator explains, the Zippo 
test adds nothing substantive to the International Shoe standard for 
personal jurisdiction.150 
 
D. Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts 
 
The requirements for personal jurisdiction in the federal courts 
differ fundamentally from personal jurisdiction in state courts.151 The 
various personal jurisdiction requirements detailed above all pertain to 
the International Shoe framework, which embodies the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.152 Notably, the federal judiciary 
is not always bound by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which acts as a limiting factor on state judiciaries.153 
When a federal court adjudicates state law claims between parties of 
different states, it exercises the judicial powers of the state in which it 
sits.154 Conversely, when a federal court considers claims arising 
under federal law it wields the judicial powers of the United States
a whole, rather than the powers of a particular state.
 as 
, 
                                                
155 In this context
the Fourteenth Amendment imposes no limitations on the powers of 
 
148 Id. at 580. 
149 Id. at 580. 
150 Id. at 581. 
151 Howard M. Erichson, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in All Federal 
Question Cases: A New Rule 4, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1117 (1989) 
152 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 311(1945) 
(examining personal jurisdiction requirements of Fourteenth Amendment). 
153 See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 1068.1 (3d ed. 2010) (federal court is only bound by 
International Shoe when considering state law claims in diversity jurisdiction).  
154 Erichson, supra note 151, at 1140. 
155 Id. The federal courts possess limited subject matter jurisdiction, which 
means that they can only hear certain types of disputes. Cf. WRIGHT & MILLER, 
supra note 153. There are two forms of subject matter jurisdiction, being: (1) 
diversity jurisdiction; and (2) subject matter jurisdiction. See id. 
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the federal government.156 Instead, the due process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment limits the federal court’s exercise of personal 
jurisdiction.157  
The language of the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause 
mirrors that of the Fourteenth Amendment’s,158 however, the Fifth 
Amendment imposes a far lower threshold requirement for the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction.159 While the due process clauses of 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment condition the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction on the defendant’s contacts with the forum, the 
critical distinction is the nature of the applicable forum.160 
Specifically, when a federal court examines an issue of federal law, the 
applicable forum is the United States as a whole.161 As a result, the 
Fifth Amendment’s threshold requirement for personal jurisdiction is 
whether the defendant has minimum contacts with the United States as 
a whole.162 Although many federal courts require that the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction must also comport with the fairness component 
of the International Shoe rubric, the majority of these circuits concede 
that these concerns are sufficiently protected through the venue and 
transfer provisions in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.163 The 
national contacts approach, however, is only one limitation on a 
federal court’s ability to exercise personal jurisdiction in cases arising 
                                                 
156 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 153. By its terms, the Fourteenth 
Amendment only applies to the states. Id.  
157 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 153. 
158 The due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment both 
provide that “no person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.” U.S. Const Amend. V.; U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. 
159 Note, Alien Corporations and Aggregate Contacts: A Genuinely Federal 
Jurisdictional Standard, 95 HARV. L. REV. 470, 484–85 (1981); cf. United States v. 
De Ortiz, 910 F.2d 376, 381 (7th Cir. 1990). 
160 See Erichson, supra note 151, at 1141. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. While the Supreme Court has declined to expressly adopt this approach, 
the federal courts generally apply this standard in claims arising under federal law. 
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 153.  
163 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 153, at n.34 (collecting cases). 
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under federal law; the defendant must also be amenable to service of 
process.164 
Given the low threshold requirement of the national contacts test, 
the federal court’s ability to exercise personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant essentially hinges on the service of process.165 When the 
federal law at issue provides for nationwide service of process, the 
service of a summons confers personal jurisdiction over any defendant 
in the United States so long as she has sufficient national contacts.166 
However, when the federal law lacks a provision that allows for 
nationwide service of process, a federal court’s exercise of personal 
jurisdiction becomes analogous to that of the local state judiciary—
both must comply with the requirements of International Shoe.167 
 
II. TYPOSQUATTING, CYBERSQUATTING, AND THE ACPA 
 
A. But Are You Still Master of Your Domain? The Rise of 
Cybersquatting 
 
Dennis Toeppen may never fully appreciate how his business 
ventures at the end of the twentieth century thrust the issue of 
cybersquatting into the national spotlight.168 During the mid-nineties, 
Toeppen registered hundreds of names incorporating widely 
recognized trademarks, such as EddieBauer.com, YankeeStadium.com, 
and NorthwestAirlines.com.169 His claim to fame, however, derived 
from his registration of the domain name Panavision.com, which he 
used to create a rudimentary website that depicted aerial photographs 
                                                 
164 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 154. 
165 See Lisak v. Mercantile Bancorp, Inc., 834 F.2d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(“Service of process is how a court gets jurisdiction over the person.”) 
166 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 154; See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(C) (stating 
that service of a summons confers personal jurisdiction over the defendant if 
authorized by federal law). 
167 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(C). 
168 Ray Everett-Church, Domain Names, in THE INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
VOLUME 1, 455 (Hossein Bigdoli ed., 2003).  
169 Id.  
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of Panna, Illinois.170 When Panavision International, holder of the 
registered trademark “Panavision,” learned of these events, it 
demanded that Toeppen refrain from using both its trademark and the 
Panavison.com domain name.171 In response, Toeppen sent a letter to 
Panavision offering to “settle the matter” for the price of $13,000, and 
inquired why Panavision would “want to fund [its] attorney’s purchase 
of a new boat” when it could obtain the domain name “cheaply and 
simply instead?”172 Rather than succumbing to these demands, 
Panavision filed suit against Toeppen for the dilution of its 
trademark.173 Toeppen instantly became what one commentator refers 
to as “the poster child for the crusade against cybersquatting.”174 
Early cybersquatters, such as Toeppen, utilized cybersquatting as 
a technology-driven form of extortion.175 Before it became 
commonplace for large corporations to develop their own websites, 
early cybersquatters would preemptively register a domain name under 
a well-known corporate trademark, hoping to sell the infringing 
domain name to the rightful trademark holder for a negotiated price.176 
Yet, even those technologically savvy trademark holders that managed 
to outrun potential cybersquatters in the race to the registrar quickly 
learned of another danger lurking along the information 
superhighway—Typosquatters.177  
As the growth of new industries often leads to specialization, a 
stylized breed of cybersquatters referred to as “typosquatters” began 
blazing their own path into the burgeoning online world. 
Understanding that the domain name game provided countless roads to 
                                                 
170 Suzanna Sherry, Haste Makes Waste: Congress and the Common Law in 
Cyberspace, 55 VAND. L. REV. 309, 322 (2002) (chronicling the background and 
controversy surrounding Panavision, Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 
1998)). 
171 Panavision, 141 F.3d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1998). 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
174 Sherry, supra note 170, at 322. 
175 Mark A. Rush, Jeffrey M. Gitchel, and Wade J. Savoy, Protecting the Open 
Seas: Fighting Cyberpiracy, 5 No. 1 CYBERSPACE LAW. 1, 18 (2000). 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
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riches, typosquatters set about incorporating misspelled—but 
strikingly similar—trademarks into domain names as an alternative to 
cybersquatting.178 By registering domain names under various 
iterations of a well-known trademark—such as YooTube.com or 
UTube.com—the typosquatter seeks to reap the profits from the 
careless spelling of unwary Internet users.179 The hasty web-surfer that 
enters “wwwebay.com” (notice the missing period after “www”) into 
her Internet browser may unintentionally fill the coffers of a clever 
typosquatter through a variety of means.180 She may find a website 
offering similar products or advertising for a business rival of the 
rightful trademark holder.181 Alternatively, she may find herself 
“mousetrapped” upon her arrival at the misspelled page, unable to exit 
due to infinite pop-up ads that provide a stream of revenue with each 
click of the mouse.182  
The innovative typosquatter can also exponentially increase her 
ill-gotten proceeds by registering countless variations of infringing 
websites.183 After all, statistical studies demonstrate that between ten 
and twenty percent of all manually entered domain names contain 
typographical errors, creating upwards of 20 million “wrong numbers” 
each day.184 These staggering statistics demonstrate how typosquatting 
legend John Zuccarini profited to the tune of $1 million dollars—each 
year—through his 3000 infringing domain names.185 To be fair, Mr. 
Zuccarini’s motivations weren’t solely profit-driven.186 Zuccarini 
gained his notoriety by mixing business with pleasure, registering 
numerous domain names that resembled children’s websites, such as 
                                                 
178 Id. 
179 Paul Boutin, The Typo Millionaires, SLATE, Feb. 11, 2005, available at 
http://www.slate.com/id/2113397. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
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“Dinseyland.com.”187 However, these innocuous looking domain 
names actually guided youthful web-surfers to an entirely different 
form of entertainment—hardcore pornography.188  
Although trademark holders prevailed in a few notable battles in 
the early days of online trademark disputes, the cybersquatters soon 
gained the upper-hand in this ongoing war by navigating through the 
loopholes in existing trademark dilution laws.189 Specifically, these 
laws required plaintiffs to demonstrate that the putative defendant 
engaged in the commercial use of the infringing domain name.190 
Many cybersquatters, however, merely “warehoused” infringing 
domain names and waited for the rightful trademark-holder to contact 
them with a lucrative purchase offer.191 This created substantial 
difficulties for trademark holders that preferred to put their resources 
toward legal remedies, as this “passive” cybersquatting failed to 
satisfy the required element of commercial use.192 As cybersquatters 
grew adept at avoiding legal sanctions, the need for new legislation 
became increasingly clear.193 
 
B. There’s a new sheriff in town:  
The Congressional enactment of the ACPA 
 
In 1999, Congress responded to the growing problem of 
cybersquatting by passing the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection 
Act (“ACPA”).194 The ACPA provides civil liability for one who 
                                                 
187 Roy Mark, Notorious URL Scammer Pleads Guilty, ESECURITY PLANET, 
Dec. 11, 2003, 
http://www.esecurityplanet.com/trends/article.php/3287981/Notorious-URL-
Scammer-Pleads-Guilty.htm. 
188 Id. 
189 Jonathon H. Anschell & John Lucas, What’s in a Name: Dealing with 
Cybersquatters, 21 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 3, 3 (2003). 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
194 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2011). The ACPA was incorporated into the Federal 
Trademark Code commonly referred to as the Lantham Act. Joseph J. Weissman, 
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“registers, traffics in, or uses” an infringing domain name, “without 
regards to the goods or services” offered by either litigant.195 Rather 
than requiring commercial use of the domain name, the ACPA only 
requires the plaintiff to demonstrate the cybersquatter’s “bad-faith 
intent to profit” from the appropriated trademark.196 To further 
alleviate the burden on plaintiffs, the ACPA provides a non-exhaustive 
list of means of demonstrating the necessary bad-faith intent to profit, 
such as: 
(I) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the 
person, if any, in the domain name;  
(II) the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal 
name of the person or a name that is otherwise commonly 
used to identify that person;  
(III) the person's prior use, if any, of the domain name in 
connection with the bona fide offering of any goods or 
services;  
(IV) the person's bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the 
mark in a site accessible under the domain name;  
(V) the person's intent to divert consumers from the mark 
owner's online location to a site accessible under the domain 
name that could harm the goodwill represented by the mark, 
either for commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish or 
disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of confusion as 
to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the 
site;  
(VI) the person's offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the 
domain name to the mark owner or any third party for 
financial gain without having used, or having an intent to use, 
the domain name in the bona fide offering of any goods or 
services, or the person's prior conduct indicating a pattern of 
such conduct; 
                                                                                                                   
The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act: Developments Through Its First 
Six Years, 95 TRADEMARK REP. 1058, 1058 (2005). 
195 See 15 U.S.C.. § 1125(d)(1)(a). 
196 See id. 
400 
27
Barbakoff: No Shoes, No Service? Why Cybersquatting Has Outgrown the Interna
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2011
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 6, Issue 2                         Spring 2011 
 
(VII) the person's provision of material and misleading false 
contact information when applying for the registration of the 
domain name, the person's intentional failure to maintain 
accurate contact information, or the person's prior conduct 
indicating a pattern of such conduct; 
(VIII) the person's registration or acquisition of multiple 
domain names which the person knows are identical or 
confusingly similar to marks of others that are distinctive at 
the time of registration of such domain names, or dilutive of 
famous marks of others that are famous at the time of 
registration of such domain names, without regard to the 
goods or services of the parties; and 
(IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the person's 
domain name registration is or is not distinctive and 
famous.197 
 
Notably, Congress expressly provided a safe harbor provision for 
domain name registrars to shelter them from liability for their 
customers’ acts of cybersquatting.198 This provision expressly exempts 
a registrar from liability for merely registering an infringing domain 
name “absent a showing of bad faith intent to profit from such 
registration or maintenance of the domain name.”199 
Although the ACPA clearly provides a targeted remedy to address 
the harm caused by cybersquatting, trademark holders often faced an 
uphill battle in bringing a cause of action for this form of online 
trademark infringement.200 While both cybersquatting and 
typosquatting may form the basis of a claim under the ACPA,201 the 
fact remains that the wrongful conduct takes place entirely online. 
                                                 
197 Id. at §§ 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I)–(IX). 
198 Id. at § 1114 (2)(D)(iii). 
199 Id. 
200 See, e.g., Subsalve USA Corp. v. Watson Mfg., Inc., 392 F. Supp. 2d 221, 
223–24 (D.R.I. 2005) (dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction upon finding that 
act of cybersquatting was not aimed at forum state). 
201 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (d)(1)(A)(ii)(I) (proscribing the registration of an 
domain name that is identical or strikingly similar to another’s previously registered 
trademark). 
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Whereas cybersquatting pioneers such as Dennis Toeppen resorted to 
outright extortion in order to profit from their trade,202 this species of 
early cybersquatting has almost entirely vanished into antiquity.203 
Modern cybersquatters have no need to ransom out their infringing 
domain names to the rightful trademark holders.204 Instead, the safer 
road to riches is lined with pay-per-click advertising and the poor 
typing skills of the masses.205 And though the ACPA is strictly a 
creature of federal law, the statute itself does not contain any provision 
for nationwide service of process.206 Thus, in claims filed under the 
ACPA, a federal court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction must comport 
with the geographic nexus requirements of International Shoe.207 
However, the Seventh Circuit’s fractured analysis in GoDaddy II 
indicates that cybersquatting has outgrown the limitations of 
International Shoe. 
 
III. UBID, INC, V. GODADDY GROUP, INC. 
 
From its headquarters in Arizona, GoDaddy provides domain 
name registration and website hosting for customers located across the 
country.208 Arguably, the company’s rapid growth is largely 
attributable to its aggressive advertising campaign.209 Its frequently-
run television commercials featuring the “GoDaddy Girls” have 
become somewhat of a staple during the past several Super Bowls.210 
                                                 
202 See supra Part II.A. As discussed earlier in this Comment, Toeppen is best 
known for registering a domain name under Panavision’s well-known trademark. He 
attempted to profit from his actions by offering to release the domain name in 
exchange for a bribe. 
203 Patrick Thibodeau, Cybersquatting Can Yield Pay-Per-Click Bounties, 
COMPUTERWORLD, Apr. 16, 2007, http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/289576. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. 
206 GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2010).  
207 Id. 
208 uBID Inc. v. GoDaddy Group, Inc. (GoDaddy I), 673 F. Supp. 2d 621, 625 
(N.D. Ill. 2009), rev’d 623 F.3d 421 (7th Cir. 2010). 
209 GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 424. 
210 Id. 
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For those that prefer stadium seating to the comforts of home, 
GoDaddy’s billboards and advertisements appear at sporting arenas 
throughout the country.211 Additionally, fans of Indycar racing may 
recognize GoDaddy’s logo from driver Danica Patrick’s car, while golf 
aficionados can glimpse it emblazoned on Anna Rawlson’s hat.212 As a 
result of its efforts, GoDaddy has emerged as one of the largest 
domain name registrars in the country.213 
Despite its national client-base, GoDaddy’s operations are limited 
almost entirely to its home state of Arizona.214 Indeed, the company 
has few offices or employees outside of its home state.215 GoDaddy 
provides the majority of its services on an automated basis; customers 
throughout the world can access GoDaddy’s services remotely through 
its website.216 Moreover, the company handles its domain name 
registration and maintenance through its computer servers in 
Scottsdale, Arizona.217  
GoDaddy’s business model provides customers with two different 
methods of registering domain names.218 First, GoDaddy’s aptly 
named “free parking” service allows its customers to register domain 
names at no-charge. GoDaddy creates a rudimentary website under its 
customers’ domain names and monetizes the sites through “pay-per-
click” advertising.219 As an alternative to its free parking services, 
GoDaddy sells a “cash parking” service, which allows its customer to 
share in the pay-per-click advertising revenue in exchange for a small 
monthly fee. 
                                                 
211 See id. at 428. Notably, the opinion only refers to GoDaddy’s billboards in 
Illinois stadiums. Id. Nevertheless, the fact that GoDaddy referred to Illinois as only 
a part of its national advertising campaign indicates that these billboards and signs 
appear at sports stadiums throughout the country. Id. 
212 Id. at 424. 
213 GoDaddy I, 673 F. Supp. 2d at 625. 
214 GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 424. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 See Complaint at ¶ 8, GoDaddy I, 673 F. Supp. 2d 621 (N.D.Ill. 2009) (No. 
09 cv 02123), 2009 WL 1109520. 
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Like GoDaddy, uBID’s revenue stream flows from the 
electronic currents of cyberspace.220 Headquartered in Chicago, uBID 
runs an online auction service that deals primarily with excess 
inventory of electronics manufacturers through its website, 
uBID.com.221 In 2009, uBID discovered that numerous individuals 
had registered 171 domain names that bore a substantial similarity
uBID.com through GoDaddy’s cash parking and free parking 
services.
 to 
                                                
222 Yet rather than pursuing the various individuals, uBID 
named a single defendant in its complaint—GoDaddy, the Internet-
based registrar that provided the infringing domain names.223  
Perhaps anticipating the difficulties created by the ACPA’s 
safe harbor provision for registrars, uBID’s allegations focused 
entirely on the manner in which GoDaddy manifested a bad-faith 
intent to profit from the parked pages created under the infringing 
domain names.224 First, GoDaddy trafficked in these infringing 
domain names despite its knowledge that they were “identical or 
confusingly similar” to uBID’s well-known trademarks.225 Second, 
GoDaddy offered to sell these infringing domain-names for “financial 
gain.”226 Third, GoDaddy used pay-per-click advertising links that 
diverted customers to the websites of uBID’s competitors.227 
In response to uBID’s complaint, GoDaddy filed a motion to 
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, to 
transfer the case to its home state of Arizona.228  
  
 
220 GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 423. 
221 Id. 
222 Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of their Motion to Dismiss, 
or, in the Alternative, to Transfer Venue, at 5, GoDaddy I, 673 F. Supp. 2d 621 
(N.D.Ill. 2009) rev’d 623 F.3d (No. 109CV02123), 2009 WL 2236587 [hereinafter 
GoDadddy’s Motion to Dismiss]. 
223 Id.  
224 See Complaint, supra note 219, at ¶ 41–43 (detailing GoDaddy’s alleged 
acts of cybersquatting). 
225 Id. at ¶ 43. 
226 Id. at ¶ 42. 
227 Id. at ¶ 41. 
228 GoDaddy I, 673 F. Supp. 2d 621, 626 (N.D.Ill. 2009). 
404 
31
Barbakoff: No Shoes, No Service? Why Cybersquatting Has Outgrown the Interna
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2011
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 6, Issue 2                         Spring 2011 
 
A. The District Court’s Dismissal for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction 
 
Penning the opinion for the district court, Judge Charles Kocoras 
began by dismissing the notion that GoDaddy’s advertising and sales 
within the state of Illinois established the “continuous and systematic” 
contacts necessary to support general jurisdiction.229 Next, Judge 
Kocoras focused on whether uBID met its burden in establishing a 
prima facie case for specific jurisdiction over its claim.230 Notably, 
Judge Korcoras excluded GoDaddy’s advertisements and the majority 
of its sales within the forum from the specific jurisdiction analysis.231 
Although uBID contended that both of these factors should weigh 
heavily in its favor, Judge Korcoras explained that the only relevant 
facts in the inquiry were those that directly pertained to the litigation 
between the parties or the “operative facts of the dispute.”232 As a 
result, the opinion’s specific jurisdiction analysis was confined to 
whether the two infringing domain names registered by Illinois 
residents established the minimum contacts needed to support specific 
jurisdiction.233  
To uBID’s dismay, Judge Korcoras answered this question in the 
negative.234 Presuming that GoDaddy had only established two Illinois 
contacts that pertained to the litigation at hand, Judge Kocoras 
determined that GoDaddy’s business model precluded any 
determination that the domain name registrar had purposefully availed 
itself such that it should “reasonably expect to be subject to 
jurisdiction in Illinois.”235 Specifically, GoDaddy had purposefully 
established a website that allowed its customers to register domain 
names on an automated basis.236 From anywhere in the world, a 
                                                 
229 Id. at 627–28. 
230 See id. at 628. 
231 See id. at 628–29. 
232 Id. at 628 (citing GCIU-Emp’r Ret. Fund v. Goldfarb Corp., 565 F.3d 1018, 
1024 (7th Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
233 GoDaddy I, 673 F. Supp. at 628. 
234 Id. at 628–29. 
235 Id. at 629. 
236 Id. 
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customer could register, purchase, and obtain a desired domain name 
without ever interacting with a GoDaddy employee.237  
Viewed from this standpoint, Judge Kocoras determined that 
GoDaddy’s customers, rather than GoDaddy itself, initiated the only 
contacts relevant to the litigation—the infringing websites registered 
by two Illinois residents.238 Reasoning that these registrations were 
“the unilateral activity of . . . third [parties],” Judge Korcoras 
explained that GoDaddy could not reasonably anticipate being haled 
into court based solely upon these contacts.239 Accordingly, the 
District Court dismissed uBID’s complaint for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.240 
 
B. The Seventh Circuit Majority’s Opinion 
 
Unwilling to accept defeat quite so easily, uBID subsequently 
appealed the district court’s ruling to the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit,241 and the majority’s opinion demonstrated that uBID 
would be rewarded for its perseverance.242 While agreeing with the 
lower court’s determination that GoDaddy’s sales and marketing 
efforts in Illinois failed to support general jurisdiction, the majority 
left no doubt that its specific jurisdiction analysis would follow a 
different line of reasoning than that of the court below.243  
Drawing support from the Supreme Court’s decision in Keeton v. 
Hustler Magazine, the court reasoned that the domain name registrar 
had purposefully availed itself within the forum as a result of its 
national business presence.244 GoDaddy, just like the defendant in 
Keeton, intentionally solicited business from every state through its 
                                                 
237 Id. 
238 Id. 
239 Id. 
240Id. at 630. 
241 GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d 421, 433 (7th Cir. 2010) (reversing the decision 
below). 
242 See id. at 423. 
243 Id. at 423, 426. 
244 Id. 
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national advertising campaign—including the forum at issue.245 As a 
reward for its efforts, GoDaddy successfully drew business from 
thousands of Illinois residents.246 And while these customers 
contributed a relatively small portion of GoDaddy’s overall revenue, 
the company nevertheless received millions from its business within 
the forum.247  
In light of this substantial revenue stream flowing from Illinois to 
GoDaddy’s corporate headquarters in Arizona, the majority opinion 
quickly pierced through the company’s attempt to shield itself behind 
its automated processing system.248 While the majority of its 
customers secure the company’s services without any human 
interaction, GoDaddy intentionally structured its business in this 
fashion.249 Citing to its own previous decisions, the majority reasoned 
that GoDaddy’s attempt to paint these Internet transactions as “the 
unilateral activities of third parties” was misleading in light of the 
significant steps that the company took before and after each 
transaction.250 As such, the court declared that “[GoDaddy] cannot 
now point to its hundreds of thousands of customers in Illinois and tell 
us, ‘It was all their idea.’”251  
Next, the court turned its attention to whether the conduct 
underlying the complaint at bar arose from or related to GoDaddy’s 
contacts with the forum.252 Noting that the Seventh Circuit’s previous 
opinions had not expressly adopted a particular means of addressing 
this question, the court majority briefly addressed the proximate 
causation and but-for causation standards employed by the majority of 
federal courts.253 The Seventh Circuit majority found the but-for 
                                                 
245 Id. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. 
248 Id. 
249 Id. 
250 Id. (citing Illinois v. Hemi Group, LLC., 622 F.3d 754, 758–59 (7th Cir. 
2010)). 
251 GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 428. 
252 Id. 
253 See id. at 430. While some may read the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning as 
expressly rejecting both standards, the court majority carefully couched its language 
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causation standard to be problematically over-inclusive, whereas the 
proximate cause standard was troublingly under-inclusive.254 
Declining to follow either approach, the majority settled upon the 
“quid pro quo” standard recently created by the Third Circuit.255 
Outlining the contours of this approach, the Seventh Circuit explained 
that the “the precise causal connection” between a defendant’s 
contacts and the plaintiff’s claim is unimportant; instead, the 
dispositive issue was whether the relationship between the two is 
“intimate enough to keep the quid pro quo proportional and personal 
jurisdiction reasonably foreseeable.”256  
Returning to the issue at bar, the majority found the relationship 
between GoDaddy’s contacts with Illinois and uBID’s complaint 
“close enough” to satisfy the relatedness inquiry.257 As to GoDaddy’s 
contacts, the majority explained that GoDaddy successfully solicited 
business from hundreds of thousands of Illinois residents through its 
advertising efforts, evidenced by the company’s substantial profits 
derived from Illinois.258 Moreover, according to the allegations in 
uBID’s complaint, GoDaddy facilitated these sales by providing “free 
parking” for its customer’s domain names.259 As to the substance of 
uBID’s complaint, it alleged that GoDaddy, in bad-faith, trafficked in 
the domain names registered under its free parking service to garner 
profits from uBID’s registered trademarks.260 As such, the court 
majority declared that the substantive relationship between GoDaddy’s 
contacts and uBID’s complaint were so “intimately related” that the 
domain name registrar could hardly be surprised to find itself haled 
into an Illinois court to defend its actions.261 
                                                                                                                   
to avoid this conclusion. Specifically, the GoDaddy majority stated that “[w]e have 
not previously endorsed either approach, and we decline to do so now. Id. 
254 Id. 
255 Id. 
256 Id. 
257 Id. at 431–32. 
258 Id. at 431. 
259 Id. (quoting Complaint, supra note 219, at ¶ 20 (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
260 Id. 
261 Id. 
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Although GoDaddy asserted that the alleged injuries occurred in 
Arizona, where the company incorporated its customers’ domain 
names into the parked page service, these arguments fell upon deaf 
ears.262 Reasoning that GoDaddy was contractually obligated to 
provide the registration services paid for by its customers, the court 
majority declared that “[w]here GoDaddy chooses to locate the servers 
that complete the task is irrelevant.”263 Nor did the majority place 
great emphasis on the fact that uBID would have the same claim 
against GoDaddy regardless of whether the customers who registered 
the infringing domain names “did so from Illinois, from Wyoming, or 
from China.”264 Rather, the majority simply explained that “the 
concept of a geographic nexus” is difficult to apply where the alleged 
wrongdoing can be described as occurring “wherever the Internet is 
accessible.”265 Notably, the majority’s opinion reasoned that the 
geographic nexus is “simply less important” where the alleged harm 
takes place online, as this is merely “one facet of the constitutional 
inquiry.”The plaintiff still must establish the defendant’s contacts with 
the forum, as well as their temporal and substantive relationship to its 
claim.266  
 
C. Justice Manion’s Concurrence 
 
While he agreed with the result reached by the majority, Justice 
Manion declared that the jurisdictional issue was controlled by an 
entirely different method—the Calder effects test.267 Formulating the 
effects test as requiring: “(1) intentional conduct; (2) expressly aimed 
at the forum state; (3) with the defendant’s knowledge that the plaintiff 
would be injured in the forum state,” the concurrence held that uBID’s 
                                                 
262 Id. at 432. 
263 Id. 
264 Id. at 431. 
265 Id.  
266 Id. 
267 Id. at 434 (Manion, J., concurring). 
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complaint established each of the required elements.268 As to the first 
element, the complaint at bar easily satisfied this requirement of 
intentional conduct through its detailed description of GoDaddy’s 
efforts to profit from the infringing domain names.  
In regards to the second element of the effects test, Justice 
Manion’s opinion seems to indicate that the act of cybersquatting—by 
its very nature—satisfies this requirement. As the concurrence 
explained, cybersquatting is simply a technology-driven method for 
“defrauding business.”269 The cybersquatter registers these domain 
names to coerce his victim into making a choice—either pay off the 
cybersquatter, or shoulder the costs of litigation.270 In this instance, the 
concurrence explained that GoDaddy’s “conduct is aimed at uBID’s 
headquarters in Illinois,” where the company will be harmed through 
its lost revenue.271  
Finally, the concurrence reasoned that GoDaddy’s alleged 
cybersquatting sufficed to demonstrate its knowledge that uBID would 
be injured in the forum state.272 “In practical terms,” the complaint 
described a “targeted scheme” that impacted uBID’s “bottom line.”273 
Logically, GoDaddy knew that its conduct would injure uBID “in 
Illinois, where uBID is incorporated, where it pays state income and 
property taxes, and where it has many employees.”274  
Looking back one last time at the second element of the effects 
test, the concurrence concluded with a final thought: Although 
acknowledging that the Seventh Circuit’s prior decisions demonstrated 
some “tension . . . about the scope and limits” of the express aiming 
component, the concurrence nevertheless concluded that this tension 
provided no reason to refrain from using the effects test “where the 
intentional acts are clearly directed at Illinois.” Moreover, to the extent 
                                                 
268 Id. at 435 (citing Virtual Works. Inc., v. Volkswagen of Am., 238 F.3d 264, 
267 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
269 Id. 
270 Id. 
271 Id. 
272 Id. at 435–36. 
273 Id. at 436. 
274 Id. 
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that a plaintiff must show “something more” to satisfy the express 
aiming requirement,” the majority’s detailed description of GoDaddy’s 
conduct within the forum satisfied “even the strictest ideas of what 
constitutes “something more.”275 
  
D. A Few Last Points 
 
Two aspects of the opinion bear a closer examination, the first of 
which is the majority’s refusal to adopt the Zippo test for personal 
jurisdiction.276 While both parties asked the court to “either adopt or 
reject” a standard that resolved the purposeful availment issue through 
“website interactivity,” the majority expressly declined to take either 
position.277 Instead, the majority declared that the interactivity of a 
defendant’s website is certainly “relevant,” but not “dispositve” in 
assessing the sufficiency of the defendant’s contacts with the forum.278 
As such, the majority explained that adopting a separate standard for 
examining “Internet-based contacts would be inappropriate when the 
traditional analysis . . . remains up to this more modern task.”279 
The second issue that stands out from the GoDaddy II decision is 
the dueling concerns voiced by the majority280 and concurring 
opinions.281 While both opinions held that exercising jurisdiction 
complied with the requirements of International Shoe, both the 
majority and concurrence nevertheless took issue with the other’s 
reasoning.282 
From the majority’s perspective, Justice Manion’s concurring 
opinion adopted an unnecessarily broad reading of the effects test.283 
                                                 
275 Id.  
276 Id. at 431 n.3. 
277 Id. 
278 Id. 
279 Id. 
280 Id. at 431 n.1 
281 Id. at 433–35 (Manion, J., concurring). 
282 Id. at 431 n.1 (voicing concerns about the concurrence’s application of 
Calder’s effects test); see also id. at 435 (Manion, J., concurring) (troubled by the 
majority’s relatedness inquiry). 
283 Id. at 431 n.1 
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Specifically, the majority felt that the concurrence’s reading of the 
express-aiming requirement would result in an overly-expansive 
jurisdictional standard for intentional tort claims.284 Here, the majority 
recognized that some federal opinions—including its own—read 
Calder as supporting jurisdiction in the plaintiff’s home state in 
“almost any alleged intentional tort.”285 Nevertheless, the majority 
warned that Calder “need not and should not” be construed “quite so 
broadly.”286 
Yet the majority opinion was not alone in its judicial finger-
wagging. Rather than confining its critique to a single footnote, Justice 
Manion spent a few pages expressing his concerns with the majority’s 
“unnecessarily broad” method of connecting GoDaddy’s forum 
contacts with uBID’s complaint.287 Significantly, Justice Manion 
accepted GoDaddy’s contention that the actual conduct underlying the 
complaint bore no relation to its contacts with Illinois.288 Specifically, 
the intentional conduct described in uBID’s complaint was entirely 
unrelated to GoDaddy’s “hundreds of thousands of Illinois customers,” 
and certainly did not “arise out of its advertising at sporting events.” 
Without any connection to the various instances of “purposeful 
availment” set forth in the majority’s opinion, Justice Manion 
explained that the court’s application of Keeton effectively rendered 
GoDaddy subject to suit in every state where the company “advertises 
and has customers.”289 In fact, the only limiting factor in the 
majority’s analysis was whether a plaintiff could point to one customer 
within the forum that registered an infringing domain 290 name.  
                                                
 
 
 
 
284 Id. 
285 Id. 
286 Id. 
287 Id. at 434 (Manion, J., concurring). 
288 Id.  
289 Id. 
290 Id. 
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III. ANALYSIS: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN CYBERSQUATTING AND THE 
GEOGRAPHIC NEXUS REQUIREMENT OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
 
A. Where the Money Is: GoDaddy II’s Potential Impact on Future 
Cybersquatting Disputes 
 
This note suggests that the true significance of GoDaddy II is the 
decision’s future impact on cybersquatting claims. In this author’s 
opinion, one of the most interesting aspects of this case is the target of 
uBID’s claim: GoDaddy. As stated earlier in this note, uBID did not 
seek to pursue any of the various individuals that actually registered 
the infringing domain names, but rather elected to bring its claim 
directly against the registrar itself.291  
Why did uBID file its suit against GoDaddy? The answer is rather 
simple. To quote the notorious bank robber Willie Sutton, “’[b]ecause 
that’s where the money is.’”292 The ACPA provides for damages up to 
$100,000.00 for each infringing domain name,293 thus uBID’s decision 
to file suit against GoDaddy stems from a simple cost-benefit analysis. 
Instead of pursuing each individual that registered an infringing-
domain name separately, uBID simply filed a single, multi-million-
dollar claim against GoDaddy.294  
The GoDaddy II decision may very well serve as a test-case for 
the future of cybersquatting claims. As domain name registrars such as 
GoDaddy are primarily “where the money is,” this author believes that 
many plaintiffs similar to uBID will rely heavily on the reasoning 
employed by both the majority and concurrence in GoDaddy II. 
Indeed, the Motion Picture Academy recently filed a similar lawsuit 
                                                 
291 GoDaddy’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 222, at 5. 
292 FBI.GOV, FBI history Famous Cases, 
http://www2.fbi.gov/libref/historic/famcases/sutton/sutton.htm (last visited March 
30, 2011). This comment comes from an interview with Willie Sutton, a notorious 
bank robber in the early 20th Century. Once asked by a reporter why he decided to 
start robbing banks, Mr. Sutton famously replied “[b]ecuase that’s where the money 
is.” See id. 
293 See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(d) (statutory damages provision for cybersquatting 
violations). 
294 GoDaddy’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 222, at 5. 
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against a domain name registrar based upon over 100 websites that 
incorporate “The Oscars” into their domain names.295 While the 
GoDaddy II opinion speaks only to the jurisdictional issues of such 
suits, rather than the actual merits of the plaintiff’s claim,296 the 
impact of the Seventh Circuit’s personal jurisdiction analysis in 
cybersquatting claims cannot be overlooked.  
future 
                                                
 
B. Extinguishing Zippo: the problems with using the interactivity of a 
website to exert personal jurisdiction over cybersquatters 
 
Before scrutinizing the analytical frameworks used by the 
majority and concurrence in GoDaddy II, the framework that the 
Seventh Circuit declined to adopt bears some consideration—the 
Zippo test for personal jurisdiction. Given the jurisdictional issues 
posed by the Internet, plaintiffs such as uBID297 often rely on the 
Zippo standard298 to support personal jurisdiction in the context of 
cybersquatting claims based on the interactivity of a defendant’s 
website. As noted earlier in this Comment, many commentators have 
begun to question the propriety of basing jurisdiction solely on the 
interactivity of a defendant’s website.299 For instance, in a typical e-
commerce claim, the interactivity of the defendant’s website lacks any 
substantial value in the jurisdictional analysis.300 
In the context of cybersquatting, the application of the Zippo 
standard is particularly baffling. Imagine that uBID sought to sue the 
individuals that actually registered the domain names that infringed 
 
295 TECHDIRT, The Oscars v. GoDaddy, 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100621/0056259883.shtml (last visited March 
30, 2011). 
296 See generally GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d 421 (7th Cir. 2010). The Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in GoDaddy II was confined solely to whether the defendant was 
subject to personal jurisdiction in Illinois. Id. 
297 Id. at 431 n.3. Specifically, uBID argued that GoDaddy’s interactive website 
supported both specific and general jurisdiction in Illinois. 
298 Zippo Mfg. Co., v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. 
Pa. 1997). 
299 See supra Part I.C (outlining academic critiques of Zippo). 
300 Dunham, supra note 146, at 580–81. 
414 
41
Barbakoff: No Shoes, No Service? Why Cybersquatting Has Outgrown the Interna
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2011
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 6, Issue 2                         Spring 2011 
 
upon its registered trademark, rather than GoDaddy. The parked pages 
created under these infringing domain names were largely passive, 
consisting of a rudimentary website filled with advertising links for 
uBID’s competitors.301 Under the Zippo standard, these passive 
websites would fail to provide a sufficient basis for personal 
jurisdiction over the nonresident cybersquatters that sought to infringe 
on uBID’s trademarks.302 Arguably, the same logic should apply to 
uBID’s suit against GoDaddy. Since the conduct underlying uBID’s 
complaint resulted from these parked pages as well,303 GoDaddy 
would also escape personal jurisdiction under the Zippo test. Indeed, 
the pay-per-click advertising that fuels modern cybersquatting304 
deprives Zippo of any real utility—which is ironic, as this standard 
was crafted specifically to deal with Internet-related claims.305 
Recognizing the inherent shortcomings of the Zippo test, the 
Seventh Circuit wisely eschewed this standard in its jurisdictional 
analysis.306Admittedly, the interactive nature of a website may provide 
some indication of whether the defendant purposefully availed itself 
by intentionally seeking to draw business from the forum.307 
Nevertheless, this intent provides no insight into the success of the 
defendant’s efforts—the critical component to establishing the 
contacts necessary to support personal jurisdiction.308 A defendant’s 
intent to create contacts with the forum is not enough to satisfy the 
requirements of International Shoe; rather, the dispositive issue is 
whether the defendant successfully created the contacts needed to 
support the exercise of personal jurisdiction.309 
 
 
                                                 
301 GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 434 (Manion, J., concurring). 
302 See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (strictly passive websites are insufficient to 
confer personal jurisdiction). 
303 GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 424. 
304 Thibodeau, supra note 203. 
305 Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124. 
306 GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 431 n.3. 
307 Id. 
308 Cf. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
309 Id. at 254. 
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C. Hustled: The Majority’s relatedness inquiry 
 
The Seventh Circuit majority relied on equitable principles to 
uphold specific jurisdiction over GoDaddy.310 Essentially, the majority 
applied the quid-pro-quo standard as a means of basing personal 
jurisdiction on a highly discretionary cost-benefit analysis.311 Rather 
than examining the actual relationship between uBID’s allegations of 
cybersquatting and GoDaddy’s contacts with the forum state, the court 
focused on the reciprocal bargain between GoDaddy and Illinois.312 
As GoDaddy garnered business from hundreds of thousands of Illino
residents through the sale of its parked page services, it was only 
proper to require the registrar to submit to jurisdiction within the state 
for claims arising from the same services.
is 
                                                
313 A closer examination of 
the majority’s opinion, however, demonstrates the flaws in its 
reasoning, and underscores the fundamental disjunction between 
cybersquatting and International Shoe. 
The majority’s opinion sought to resolve the conflict between the 
virtual conduct that constitutes cybersquatting with the only activities 
that GoDaddy conducted within the state of Illinois—GoDaddy’s 
successful exploitation of the forum state.314 From the majority’s 
viewpoint, this geographic link stemmed from two sources: 
GoDaddy’s national advertising campaign, and its hundreds of 
thousands of Illinois-based customers.315 Based on these contacts, the 
majority reasoned that GoDaddy’s exploitation of the Illinois market 
created the same basis for specific jurisdiction as Hustler Magazine’s 
exploitation of the New Hampshire market.316 But as Justice Manion 
recognized in his concurrence, this analogy ultimately fails.317 
 
310 Cf. GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 431–32. 
311 Id.  
312 Id. at 431. 
313 Id.  
314 Id. at 431 (finding the relationship between GoDaddy’s numerous Illinois 
customers and the cybersquatting alleged in uBID’s complaint was “close enough” 
to satisfy the relatedness requirement). 
315 Id. at 433–35 (Manion, J., concurring). 
316 Id. 
317 See id. 
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The libel claim in Keeton provided a direct geographic nexus 
between the defendant’s exploitation of the forum market and the 
substance of the plaintiff’s claim.318 Because the tort of libel occurs 
wherever the allegedly defamatory publication is circulated319the 
portion of the plaintiff’s libel claim that occurred in New Hampshire 
arose at the precise moment that the defendant circulated ten to fifteen 
thousand copies of its magazines within the forum.320 This direct 
causal connection rendered the Keeton defendant’s exploitation of the 
forum market relevant to the Supreme Court’s specific jurisdiction 
analysis.321  
Conversely, GoDaddy’s exploitation of the forum market bore 
absolutely no relation to the substance of uBID’s claim.322 In fact, the 
majority failed to recognize that no aspect of either GoDaddy’s 
advertising campaign or its numerous Illinois customers played any 
role in uBID’s cybersquatting allegations.323 This issue stemmed 
directly from the majority’s failure to recognize the actual elements of 
cybersquatting.324 Under the ACPA’s safe harbor provision, the 
registration of an infringing domain name, on its own, does not render 
a domain name registrar liable under the ACPA.325 Instead, the safe 
harbor provision requires some demonstration of the registrar’s bad-
faith intent to profit from the domain name.326  
In light of the ACPA’s safe harbor provision, the substance of 
uBID’s allegations centered entirely around the manner in which 
                                                 
318 See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770, 778 (1984). 
319 Id. 
320 Cf. id. at 772, 778. As libel occurs at the point of circulation, the defendant’s 
circulation of ten to fifteen thousand copies of the magazine effectively created ten 
to fifteen thousand claims of libel within the forum state. Id. at 772, 778. 
321 Id. at 773. 
322 GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 434 (Manion, J., concurring).  
323 Id.  
324 Id.  
325 Id. The ACPA specifically provides a safe harbor provision for domain 
name registrars such as GoDaddy. This provision provides that liability will not fall 
on these companies upon the registration of an infringing domain name. Id., (citing 
15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(iii)). 
326 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(iii). 
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GoDaddy manifested a bad-faith intent to profit—the various means 
through which GoDaddy monetized the parked pages created under 
the infringing domain names.327 Unfortunately, the majority failed to 
recognize that none of these allegedly wrongful activities created any 
geographic connection between GoDaddy and the forum state.328 
Certainly, GoDaddy did not create these parked pages in Illinois.329 
Nor did GoDaddy place any advertising links on these parked pages in 
the forum state.330 Rather, all of the conduct described above actually 
occurred online—or at best, at GoDaddy’s headquarters in Arizona.331  
This is precisely why none of GoDaddy’s hundreds of thousands 
of Illinois customers had any relationship with uBID’s cybersquatting 
claim. These contacts were nothing more than completely legitimate 
business transactions that bore no relation to the intentional conduct 
described in uBID’s complaint.332 Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit 
majority found that these perfectly legitimate contracts were “closely 
enough related” to the substance of uBID’s claim.333  
Even when one ignores the ACPA’s safe harbor provision to 
assume that the actual registration of these domain names rendered 
GoDaddy liable for cybersquatting, only two out of the 171 infringing 
domain names were registered by Illinois residents.334 Notably, the 
Seventh Circuit believed that these two registrations from within the 
forum created the necessary geographic nexus between contacts, 
claim, and forum to uphold specific jurisdiction over GoDaddy.335 
                                                 
327 GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 434 (Manion, J., concurring). 
328 Id.  
329 See id. (recognizing that all of the conduct alleged in GoDaddy’s complaint 
involved the creation and monetization of parked pages). 
330 Id. 
331 Id. 
332 Cf. GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 431. Notably, the Seventh Circuit seemed to 
take issue with GoDaddy’s entire business model by assuming that GoDaddy’s 
alleged intent to profit from uBID’s marks was indistinguishable from the services it 
provided to numerous Illinois customers who only sought to register legitimate 
domain names of their own choosing. Id. 
333 Id. 
334 GoDaddy’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 222, at 5. 
335 GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 432. 
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This reasoning overlooks the fact that one cannot connect GoDadd
alleged acts of cybersquatting to its forum contacts under the but-for 
cause standard—the same standard that the majority dismissed as 
overly-inclusive.
y’s 
                                                
336 
Although GoDaddy’s successful exploitation of the forum market 
may arguably serve as a but-for cause for the two domain names 
registered by Illinois residents, removing these contacts from the 
causal chain would not alter the substance of uBID’s complaint.337 
Specifically, this would still leave 169 infringing domain names in 
GoDaddy’s servers,338 leaving the register perfectly capable of 
engaging in each intentional act described in uBID’s complaint.  
The majority’s relatedness inquiry raises substantial concerns 
because the cornerstone of specific jurisdiction is whether the 
plaintiff’s claim arises from or relates to the defendant’s contacts with 
the forum state.339 The geographic nexus between contacts and claim 
allows a defendant to reasonably anticipate that her conduct will 
subject her to specific jurisdiction within the forum.340 Nevertheless, 
the majority dismissed this crucial policy consideration by declaring 
that “physical geographical nexus is simply less important” when the 
wrongful conduct occurs via the Internet.341 While the Seventh Circuit 
majority may dismiss the importance of this requirement, GoDaddy 
certainly would have preferred some measure of warning that it would 
be required to submit to jurisdiction in Illinois based on the alleged 
acts of wrongdoing set forth in uBID’s complaint. 
Although the Seventh Circuit declared that “due process does not 
require [the court] to slice GoDaddy’s alleged wrongdoing so finely,” 
this argument turns the International Shoe framework for specific 
jurisdiction on its head.342 While general jurisdiction only examines 
 
336 Id. at 430. 
337 Contra Nowak v. Tak How Inv., Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 715 (1st Cir. 1996) (but-
for cause standard requires a showing that the injury would not have occurred in the 
absence of the defendant’s forum contacts). 
338 GoDaddy’s  Motion to Dismiss, supra note 222, at 5. 
339 Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472–73 (1985). 
340 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). 
341 GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 431.  
342 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472–73. 
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the geographic nexus between the defendant and the forum,343 specific 
jurisdiction is conditioned entirely on an additional nexus between the 
defendant’s contacts and the plaintiff’s claim.344 
The majority’s opinion did not simply misapply the requirements 
of International Shoe; rather, it blurred the distinction between general 
and specific jurisdiction through its application of the quid-pro-quo 
standard.345 Indeed, the court implicitly conceded this fact by 
dismissing the importance of the relationship between contacts and 
claim, admitting that uBID would have the same claim against 
GoDaddy regardless of whether the customers that registered the 
infringing domain names did so “from Illinois, from Wyoming, or 
from China.”346 This casual disregard for the necessary relationship 
between contacts and claim allowed the Court to uphold jurisdiction 
over uBID’s claim through a gray area between specific and general 
jurisdiction.347 As a result, the majority’s discretionary cost-benefit 
analysis subjected GoDaddy to what can only be described as 
“intermediate jurisdiction”—a concept that perverts the requirements 
of International Shoe. 
 
D. The Unintended Effects of Justice Manion’s concurrence 
 
Although Justice Manion chided the majority for its overly 
expansive method of exerting personal jurisdiction over uBID’s 
claim,348 his concurring opinion fared little better. After recognizing 
that none of GoDaddy’s forum contacts lacked a sufficient connection 
to uBID’s claim, Justice Manion reached for the most attractive 
                                                 
343 Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.W. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 
(1984). 
344 See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472–73 (plaintiff’s claim must arise from or 
relate to defendant’s contacts). 
345 Cf. GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 431. 
346 Id. at 431. 
347 Compare Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 (general jurisdiction does not 
require relationship between contacts and claim), with Burger King, 471 U.S. at 
472–73 (specific jurisdiction is only proper when claim arises from or relates to 
defendant’s contacts with forum). 
348 GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 434 (Manion, J., concurring). 
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analytical framework in cybersquatting disputes—the effects test.349 
The effects test, as discussed earlier in this Comment,350 sets forth a 
three pronged test for asserting specific jurisdiction over an intentional 
tort committed outside of the forum state, being: (1) intentional 
conduct; (2) expressly aimed at the forum state; and (3) with the 
defendant’s knowledge that the brunt of the harm will be felt within 
the forum.351 Yet, whereas the majority’s application of Keeton 
operated in the twilight zone of intermediate jurisdiction, Justice 
Manion’s application created a far more troubling precedent—
universal jurisdiction. 
Justice Manion failed to recognize the unique factual 
circumstances underlying his chosen jurisdictional framework.352 
Namely, Calder’s effects test should not be read as an alternative to the 
International Shoe framework.353 Rather, the Supreme Court’s opinion 
in Calder carefully outlined the manner in which the defendants 
expressly aimed their conduct at the forum, as they relied exclusively 
on California sources to provide damaging information about the 
plaintiff.354 In this fashion, the Calder defendants reached into the 
forum to gather the necessary materials for their allegedly libelous 
article.355 Moreover, the forum became the focal point for the 
damaging effects of the article because it dealt solely with the 
plaintiff’s personal life and career as an entertainer in California.356  
Conversely, Justice Manion simply reasoned that GoDaddy 
engaged in a “targeted scheme” to deprive uBID of profits through its 
alleged acts of cybersquatting.357 While this allegation speaks to the 
intentional nature of GoDaddy’s conduct, it fails to illuminate how 
                                                 
349Id. at 435.  
350 See supra Part I.B.2. 
351 GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 435 (Manion, J., concurring). 
352 See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–90 (1984) (detailing the manner in 
which the defendant’s formed the necessary contacts with the forum state). 
353 Id. at 790 (demonstrating that in certain circumstances, the commission of 
an intentional tort may form the contacts required by International Shoe). 
354 Id. at 789–90. 
355 Id. 
356 Id. 
357 Id. 
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GoDaddy expressly aimed its conduct at the forum state.358 Rather, the 
concurrence simply posited that this scheme would affect uBID’s 
bottom line, and thus was aimed at uBID’s headquarters in Illinois.359 
This terse statement simply conflates the express aiming prong with 
the third prong of the effects test—the defendant’s knowledge that his 
conduct will cause the greatest injury to the plaintiff within the 
forum.360 
The problem with Justice Manion’s reasoning is that it substitutes 
the one element that creates the defendant’s contacts with the forum 
state—the express aiming component—with the defendant’s 
awareness of the plaintiff’s home state.361 Under this reading of 
Calder, the express aiming requirement becomes a foregone 
conclusion in cases involving a corporate plaintiff because the location 
of its corporate headquarters is public information.362 Similarly, 
Justice Manion’s application of Calder obviates the third element of 
Calder whenever the harm is economic in nature, as any impact 
plaintiff’s bottom-line will naturally be felt at its corporate 
headquarters.
on the 
                                                
363  
This is precisely why Justice Manion’s explication of the Calder 
effects test paves the way for universal jurisdiction. Essentially, his 
opinion collapses the effects test’s stringent, tripartite analysis into a 
single element—the commission of an intentional tort.364 Under this 
reasoning, personal jurisdiction is automatically conferred in the 
plaintiff’s home state upon the commission of any intentional tort that 
causes economic harm.365 Yet, if the Supreme Court intended to set 
 
358 See Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(something more is required than mere foreseeability of harmful effect felt within the 
forum). 
359 GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d 421, 435 (7th Cir. 2010) (Manion, J., concurring).  
360 Id. at 435. 
361 Contra Pebble Beach, 453 F.3d at 1156. 
362 See, e.g,. CYBERDRIVE ILLINOIS, http://www.ilsos.gov/corporatellc/ (last 
visited 30, 2011) (website that maintains corporate records of corporation certificates 
in Illinois). 
363 Cf. GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 427 n.1. 
364 Id. 
365 Cf. id. 
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such a low threshold for personal jurisdiction it would have expressly 
stated as much in Calder, thus sparing the time and energy needed to 
formulate the three-pronged effects test. Clearly, this was not the 
Court’s intent, as this reasoning resolves the personal jurisdictional 
analysis based on the plaintiff’s contacts with the forum, rather than 
the defendants.366 Naturally, this type of universal jurisdiction finds no 
support from International Shoe and its progeny, which demonstrate 
that the critical issue is the geographical connection between the 
defendant and the forum state.367 The effects test simply provides an 
alternate means of analyzing International Shoe’s due process 
requirements, rather than an alternative to the requirements of due 
process. 
 
 
E. A Proposed Solution: The Need for Nationwide Service of Process 
under the ACPA 
  
Ironically, while the reasoning employed by the Seventh Circuit 
majority and concurrence in GoDaddy II undermines the due process 
requirements of personal jurisdiction, their shared decision to uphold 
personal jurisdiction over GoDaddy actually furthers the policy 
rationale that gave rise to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
International Shoe.368 The Court created the International Shoe 
framework as a means of adapting to the modernization of interstate 
commerce during the first half of the twentieth century.369 Just as 
technological advances in travel and communication increased the 
ease of conducting business across state lines, the International Shoe 
reflected an equitable determination that “the need for jurisdiction 
                                                 
366 Contra Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (explaining that the 
plaintiff’s relationship with the forum cannot support the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction). 
367 Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472–73 (1985). 
368 Specifically, the Court recognized that increased ease of engaging in 
interstate commerce prompted the need for a flexible means of exerting jurisdiction 
over nonresident defendants. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 250–51.  
369 Id.  
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over nonresidents” warranted a similar increase.370 As such, while the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision to uphold personal jurisdiction over 
GoDaddy may not comply with the letter of International Shoe, it 
certainly complies with the spirit of the Court’s decision. 
Clearly, the rise of the Internet has radically transformed the 
manner in which most business conduct transactions across state 
lines.371 Yet, the cybersquatter is uniquely able to derive profits from 
across state lines without ever creating the forum contacts necessary to 
support personal jurisdiction therein. She has no need for warehouses, 
offices, or employees. Instead, she can earn her living without ever 
having to leave the comfort of her home. If the Internet permits 
cybersquatters to benefit from their wrongful conduct by deriving 
profits from across the nation, this privilege should carry with it the 
associated cost of personal jurisdiction outside of their home state.372 
In particular, the need for a relaxed standard for personal jurisdiction 
in cybersquatting claims becomes far more urgent when one considers 
that domain name registrars—such as GoDaddy—may also run afoul 
of the ACPA.373  
The Internet has created a unique niche for domain name 
registrars, allowing these companies to siphon billions of dollars from 
a worldwide market374 without the need to establish brick-and-mortar 
offices outside of their corporate headquarters.375 For instance, 
GoDaddy is an industry leader in domain name registration.376 Its 
                                                 
370 Id. 
371 Tavakoli & Yohannan, supra note 3, at 3. 
372 Cf. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 250–51. 
373 See generally GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d 421 (7th Cir. 2010). The case that 
forms the backdrop of this Comment arose from a cybersquatting claim filed against 
the domain name registrar, rather than the registrants themselves. 
374 The Digital 100: The World’s Most Valuable Startups, BUSINESS INSIDER, 
Sept. 23, 2010, http://www.businessinsider.com/digital-100?op=1. [hereinafter The 
Digital 100]. 
375 Id. at 424 (noting that GoDaddy has almost no physical presence outside of 
its home state of Arizona). 
376 See GODADDY, http://www.godaddy.com/ (last visited March 15, 2011); see 
also GoDaddy’s BlackBoard, BUSINESS INSIDER, June 10, 2010, 
http://www.businessinsider.com/blackboard/godaddy. The company proudly 
proclaims itself to be the largest domain name provider in the world. Id.  
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business presence does not merely extend throughout the country; it 
extends across the globe.377 At the time GoDaddy II was decided, the 
company had an estimated value of more than a billion dollars.378 
Industry analysts projected that the company’s profits would grow 
from approximately eight hundred million to more than one billion 
dollars in 2011.379  
Due to its unique business model, GoDaddy has accomplished 
this feat without the need to establish any additional premises outside 
its home state of Arizona.380 While the International Shoe rubric for 
personal jurisdiction may prevent plaintiffs from bringing 
cybersquatting claims against GoDaddy outside of its home state, the 
equitable considerations underlying International Shoe seem to 
demand a different result.381  
This Comment suggests that Congress—rather than the federal 
judiciary—holds the key to resolving the conflict between the personal 
jurisdiction framework of International Shoe and cybersquatting 
complaints filed under the ACPA. With just a stroke of the pen, 
Congress can amend the ACPA to provide for nationwide service of 
process.382 Such an amendment would free the federal judiciary from 
relying on the International Shoe framework to uphold personal 
jurisdiction over cybersquatting complaints.383  
Some critics may contend that this measure is inappropriate, given 
that plaintiffs may file a complaint under the ACPA in the state 
court.384 While this is certainly true, both economic and practical 
considerations undermine this rationale. Specifically, a state court 
                                                 
377 Id.  
378 The Digital 100, supra note 374. 
379 Id. 
380 GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d 421, 424 (7th Cir. 2010). 
381 Cf. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250–51 (1958). 
382 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 154. 
383 Id. 
384 The ACPA is part of the Lantham Act, which does not provide federal 
courts with exclusive jurisdiction over trademark claims. See 28 U.S. § 1338 (2006) 
(federal courts have original jurisdiction over trademark claims, but not exclusive 
jurisdiction). As a result, a plaintiff may bring a claim under the ACPA in state 
court. See id. 
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must comply with the requirements of International Shoe’s framework 
for personal jurisdiction.385 This renders it highly unlikely that a 
plaintiff would expend both the time and money needed to file a 
cybersquatting complaint in state court only to risk having the 
complaint dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.386 Apart from 
the economic interests of the plaintiff, a provision for nationwide 
service of process under the ACPA would also protect the liberty 
interests of the defendant to the same extent as the International Shoe
rubric for personal juri
 
sdiction. 
                                                
The geographic nexus requirement of International Shoe ensures 
that the defendant can reasonably anticipate that her intentional 
conduct will subject her to personal jurisdiction within the forum.387 
Yet, the absence of this requirement may not prevent a federal court 
from upholding cybersquatting complaints filed under the ACPA—as 
demonstrated by the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in GoDaddy II. 
Conversely, a provision that allows for nationwide service of process 
under the ACPA will resolve this issue by bringing the requirement of 
reasonable anticipation back into the equation. Specifically, this 
provision would provide individuals with constructive notice that their 
chosen domain name may require them to defend their actions in the 
federal courts of any given state.388 Naturally, individuals can avoid 
this undesirable result by first determining whether their chosen 
domain name infringes upon another entity’s previously registered 
trademark.389 As such, a provision that allows for nationwide service 
of process would actually further the interests of due process by 
“giv[ing] a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows 
 
385 GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 425. 
386 GoDaddy I, 637 F. Supp. 2d 621, 630 (N.D.Ill. 2009) rev’d 623 F.3d (7th 
Cir. 2010) (dismissing claim for lack of personal jurisdiction). 
387 Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985); accord World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 
U.S. 186, 218, (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
388 Cf. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472. 
389 For instance, one can perform a free search through a database of registered 
trademarks. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, Trademark 
Electronic Search System, http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/index.jsp (last visited 
April 2, 2011). 
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potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some 
minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render 
them liable to suit.”390 
While some may argue that the economic interests of the 
defendant may outweigh the degree of predictability provided by  
nationwide service of process under the ACPA, the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure provide a sufficient means of addressing these 
concerns.391 Specifically, the defendant can avoid the costs of 
litigating in a distant forum by filing a motion to transfer the case to 
another venue.392 Alternatively, the GoDaddy II opinion demonstrates 
that these litigation costs already exist without a provision for 
nationwide service of process. The equitable considerations that 
promoted the Seventh Circuit’s decision will likely provide similar 
outcomes in future cybersquatting suits. Moreover, the precedent set 
by these decisions may begin to impact jurisdictional inquiries in other 
areas of law, undermining the element of predictability that the 
International Shoe framework seeks to provide.393  
A congressional amendment that provides for nationwide service 
of process would bring an end to the jurisdictional nightmare created 
by cybersquatting. This solution would allow the federal judiciary to 
adhere to the policy considerations that gave rise to the International 
Shoe framework—without undermining its requirements in the 
process. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As Chief Justice Warren once warned, the rapid technological 
shifts that ease the restrictions on interstate commerce must not lay 
waste to the traditional limitations on personal jurisdiction.394 In its 
effort to abide by Justice Warren’s mandate, the Seventh Circuit’s 
opinion in GoDaddy II cast aside the same due process considerations 
                                                 
390 World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 
391 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (Change of Venue). 
392 Id. 
393 World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 
394 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250–51 (1958). 
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which they struggled to preserve. The fractured reasoning employed 
by both the court majority and concurrence each demonstrate how 
cybersquatting has outgrown the limitations of International Shoe. The 
key to resolving this disjunction, however, lies with Congress, rather 
than the courts. As the ACPA provides targeted means of combating 
the problems created by cybersquatters, it should naturally provide a 
targeted means of subjecting these individuals to personal jurisdiction 
outside of their home state. Therefore, Congress must step in to 
resolve this jurisdictional quagmire by amending the ACPA to provide 
for nationwide service of process. Such an amendment would allow 
the federal judiciary to comply with the due process considerations 
embodied in International Shoe—without eviscerating its 
requirements in the process.  
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